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DEBATE 
 
THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
In The Right to Remain Silent, Professors Charles Weisselberg and 
Stephanos Bibas debate the state of the right to remain silent after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins, which held that a 
suspect in custody must affirmatively state her intent to remain silent 
in order to invoke that right.  Professor Weisselberg recounts the in-
terrogation of Mr. Thompkins and argues that the majority in 
Thompkins rejected the fundamental underpinnings of Miranda v. 
Arizona’s prophylactic rule and established a new one that fails to pro-
tect the rights of suspects.   
Professor Bibas argues that the Court’s holding reflects a proper 
rejection of Miranda’s “failed experiment,” which ignored the Fifth 
Amendment’s compulsion requirement and did not establish ade-
quate safeguards for the innocent suspects who need them.  He posits 
that the tougher question is how to reform the system so that it does 
protect the innocent, and he further suggests that videotaping all in-
terrogations would go a long way toward ensuring that confessions are 
free from compulsion. 
70 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 69 
PENNumbra 
OPENING STATEMENT 
Symbol, Not Safeguard 
Charles Weisselberg†
More people have probably heard of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), than any other criminal procedure decision..  As a symbol 
of American justice and fair play, Miranda endures.  But as a meaning-
ful safeguard for suspects’ Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination, Miranda is dead.  I contend that Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010), has fully undermined Miranda’s 
safeguards and will significantly alter police practices.  The new deci-
sion also reveals a Court that rejects Miranda’s most basic premise—
that the process of in-custody interrogation contains “inherently com-
pelling pressures” that jeopardize a suspect’s ability to exercise the 
privilege, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436, 467, 478—even while the Court 
claims to preserve Miranda’s protections. 
 
I.  THOMPKINS 
Let’s start with the facts.  Van Chester Thompkins was arrested for 
murder.  Two police officers sought to question him.  They notified 
Thompkins of his rights by reading from a “Notification of Constitu-
tional Rights” form that he refused to sign.  Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 
2256.  The officers never expressly asked Thompkins if he was willing 
to speak with them, but simply launched into questioning.  The inter-
rogation was right out of the police manuals.  It was a one-sided, accu-
satory monologue by officers who tried different themes to get 
Thompkins to talk.  Id. at 2267 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  The 
record of the interrogation was sparse—the officers did not use avail-
able recording equipment—though it is undisputed that Thompkins 
remained essentially silent.  Joint Appendix at 160a, Thompkins, 130 S. 
Ct. 2250 (No. 08-1470), 2009 WL 4716053, at *160a.  Neither officer 
could later remember much of what, if anything, Thompkins said dur-
ing the first few hours of interrogation.  However, the officers did re-
call that after about two hours and forty-five minutes of fruitless hec-
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toring, Thompkins gave an incriminating response when asked if he 
prayed to God to forgive him for shooting the victim.  Thompkins, 130 
S. Ct. at 2257.  The trial court admitted Thompkins’s response and the 
state courts affirmed his conviction.  Thompkins then filed a federal 
habeas corpus petition, which eventually reached the Supreme Court. 
The justices could have resolved the case on the limited question 
of whether the state courts had unreasonably applied clearly estab-
lished federal law, the deferential standard used in federal habeas cas-
es.  28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (2006).  That was the main argument of Mich-
igan’s lawyer.  Solicitor General Elena Kagan, however, filed an ami-
cus curiae brief urging the justices to go further.  Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7-8, Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (No. 08-1470).  In a 5-4 ruling, the 
majority followed her lead and rewrote the rules governing invoca-
tions and waivers. 
II.  INVOCATIONS AFTER THOMPKINS 
Miranda provides that to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege, 
warnings must be given prior to custodial questioning.  If the suspect 
“indicates in any manner . . . that he wishes to remain silent” or “states 
that he wants an attorney,” then “the interrogation must cease.”  Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).  Sixteen years ago, the 
Court ruled that a suspect who initially waives her rights but later 
seeks to halt questioning by asking for a lawyer must do so clearly and 
unambiguously.  Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).  
Thompkins revises Miranda by extending Davis to the right to remain 
silent and even to interrogations in which a suspect did not earlier 
agree to talk.  After Thompkins, the right to remain silent can no long-
er be invoked in “any manner.”  Counterintuitively, a suspect must 
speak to claim the right to silence. 
In Davis, the Court pointed to the especially powerful protections 
that come into play under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), 
when someone invokes the right to counsel.  See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 
(noting that Edwards held that “if a suspect requests counsel at any 
time during [a police] interview, he is not subject to further question-
ing until a lawyer has been made available”).  The justices in Davis said 
that the strong protections of Edwards must be affirmatively invoked, 
and unless the defendant makes “an unambiguous or unequivocal 
request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop question-
ing him.”  Id. at 461-62.  Though the stronger Edwards protections do 
not apply when a suspect has only invoked the right to remain silent, 
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the Thompkins Court found “good reason to require an accused who 
wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent to do so unambi-
guously” because this avoids difficulties of proof and provides guid-
ance to officers.  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010).  
Nor did it matter to the Court that Thompkins—unlike Davis—had 
not initially agreed to speak with officers.  Thus, any invocation at any 
stage must be articulated with precision. 
Of course, a suspect still can remain mum during hours of inter-
rogation.  But to claim the right to remain silent within the meaning 
of Miranda—and trigger the officers’ duty to stop questioning—the 
suspect must affirmatively speak.  That a suspect can no longer trigger 
the officers’ duty merely by remaining silent is plain from Thompkins, 
since his refusal to talk for almost three hours was insufficient to re-
quire police to curtail their questioning. 
III.  WAIVERS AFTER THOMPKINS 
Miranda establishes that before any statement is introduced into 
evidence, the government must satisfy the “heavy burden” of showing 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 473, 475-76 (1966).  The waiver inquiry would be the primary 
mechanism to assess whether the decision to speak was made free 
from pressure.  Waiver would “not be presumed” from the fact that a 
confession was eventually obtained.  Id. at 475.  Lengthy interrogation 
preceding a statement would be “strong evidence” of an invalid waiver 
and that “the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced” 
the suspect to speak.  Id. at 476.  Little is now left of these principles. 
Thompkins shifts the burden of proof of waiver or, at least, makes 
the burden featherweight.  The Court held that “[w]here the prosecu-
tion shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was unders-
tood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an 
implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”  Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 
2262.  Since the prosecution already must prove that warnings were 
given and that a voluntary statement was made in order to admit the 
statement, the only additional requirement for waiver is that the ac-
cused understood the warnings.  But the Court made clear that it is pri-
marily the defendant’s burden to show a lack of understanding.  While the 
majority noted that Thompkins could read English and had time to read 
the warnings, the justices emphasized first and foremost that “there is no 
contention that Thompkins did not understand his rights; and from this 
it follows that he knew what he gave up when he spoke.”  Id. 
2010] The Right to Remain Silent 73 
The majority found an implied Miranda waiver on an extreme set 
of facts.  Rejecting the argument that officers must obtain a Miranda 
waiver before questioning a suspect, a waiver can now be obtained in 
the middle of an interrogation: “The fact that Thompkins made a 
statement about three hours after receiving a Miranda warning does 
not overcome the fact that he engaged in a course of conduct indicat-
ing waiver.”  Id. at 2263. 
The relocation of waiver into the heart of an interrogation and 
the finding of implied waiver after hours of questioning remake the 
waiver doctrine.  In North Carolina v. Butler, the only prior Supreme 
Court implied waiver case, the defendant agreed to talk with police 
but balked at signing a written form.  441 U.S. 369, 371 (1979).  The 
Court found that waiver can be inferred from actions and words, and 
remanded for the state courts to decide whether Butler had given up 
his rights.  Id. at 373, 376.  Since Butler, all federal circuits, as well as 
appellate courts in at least forty-two states and the District of Colum-
bia, have upheld the admission of statements based upon implied Mi-
randa waivers.  Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. 
REV. 1519, 1581-83 (2008).  But in Thompkins, neither Michigan nor 
the Solicitor General were able to cite any decision in which a court 
found that a suspect had given an implied waiver after lengthy ques-
tioning.  Thompkins persevered for almost three hours before suc-
cumbing to his interrogators.  In finding a waiver on these facts, 
Thompkins gives us an implied waiver doctrine on steroids. 
IV.  IGNORING MIRANDA’S PREMISE 
What is missing from the Thompkins majority’s opinion is any un-
derstanding of how the process of interrogation influences suspects’ 
behavior.  The justices wholly disregarded what happened in the 
hours between the warnings and Thompkins’s statement. 
This disregard is contrary to Miranda’s basic premise:  modern 
custodial interrogations contain inherently compelling pressures that 
jeopardize the privilege.  These pressures are the very reason safe-
guards are needed at all.  In Miranda, Justice White asked how we 
could assume that those same compelling pressures would not taint 
waivers.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dis-
senting).  As a practical matter, the Miranda Court alleviated this con-
cern by requiring the safeguards to be employed before questioning 
begins.  But if waiver can be found after hours of pressure-filled inter-
rogation, surely Justice White’s question becomes central.  Yet the 
Thompkins majority failed even to consider how Thompkins’s lengthy 
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interrogation led to waiver.  Rather, the Court only asked whether his 
statement was coerced under traditional voluntariness standards, say-
ing that “Thompkins does not claim that police threatened or injured 
him during the interrogation or that he was in any way fearful.”  Berg-
huis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010).  Further, the majority 
insisted, “there is no authority that an interrogation of this length is 
inherently coercive.”  Id. 
This lack of concern about the validity of a waiver given after 
hours of interrogation is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of 
Thompkins.  The majority’s opinion reflects a rejection of Miranda’s 
core premise, or at least a willingness to discount it entirely.  That 
leaves the Miranda doctrine at war with itself, for without faith in Mi-
randa’s premise, there is no need for any safeguards at all.   
V. ARE MIRANDA’S SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVE? 
But if we accept (as I do) the Miranda Court’s determination that 
custodial interrogations contain compelling pressures, does today’s Mi-
randa doctrine afford suspects a meaningful ability to choose between 
speech and silence?  It is difficult to conclude that it does. 
To begin, there are good reasons to doubt that any set of standar-
dized warnings or one-size-fits-all safeguards could be uniformly effec-
tive.  Although the Miranda Court had police manuals to assess the 
impact of modern interrogation techniques, there was no empirical 
basis for the justices’ conclusion that a system of warnings and waivers 
could actually counter the “inherently compelling pressures” of cus-
todial interrogation.  Miranda’s prophylaxis “rested upon an untested, 
unverified, and unproven assumption . . . that [warnings] . . . work.”  
Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning:  The Constitution, Confes-
sions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 517 (2002).  
The social science literature now shows that we cannot assume that 
warnings effectively enable suspects to understand their rights, given 
the varying language of the warnings and the varying capabilities of 
suspects, among other reasons.  Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced 
Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 
7-9 (2009) (White Paper adopted by the American Psychology-Law 
Society); Weisselberg, supra, at 1563-77. 
Regardless of whether Miranda’s safeguards could ever have been 
effective, decisions predating Thompkins significantly undermined 
them.  As Colorado v. Spring made clear, officers do not have to tell 
suspects which crimes they are suspected of committing.  479 U.S. 
564, 576 (1987).  Nor must they tell suspects that an attorney is trying 
2010] The Right to Remain Silent 75 
to contact them.  Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986).  Yet sure-
ly this is information suspects would want to know before deciding 
whether to speak.  Moreover, the warnings do not have to contain any 
particular language.  Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1206 (2010).  
Officers can sometimes tell suspects that they are free to leave and 
make it appear as if even a stationhouse interrogation is noncustodial, 
thereby manipulating the boundary of Miranda’s protections.  Cf. 
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 326 (1994) (per curiam) 
(“[O]fficers’ subjective and undisclosed suspicions . . . do not bear 
upon the question whether [a suspect is] in custody, for purposes of 
Miranda, during the station house interview.”); California v. Beheler, 
463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per curiam) (holding that Miranda warnings are 
not required when a suspect voluntarily comes to the stationhouse, is 
told he is not under arrest, and is allowed to leave voluntarily). 
I am not the first to suggest that Miranda’s heralded safeguards 
fall short.  The late Welsh White (among others) made this point with 
particular force almost a decade ago.  WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S 
WANING PROTECTIONS (2001).  Richard Leo—perhaps our country’s 
most ardent scholar of the interrogation process—explains that “the 
Miranda ritual makes almost no practical difference in American po-
lice interrogation.”  RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 124 (2008).  He goes on to say that officers “have 
learned how to ‘work Miranda’ to their advantage” and concludes that 
“once waived, Miranda does not affect the subsequent interrogation 
because it does not prohibit any post-waiver techniques.”  Id. 
Two years ago, I wrote that as a prophylactic device to protect sus-
pects’ Fifth Amendment privilege, Miranda was effectively dead.  The 
causes were varied, but included the then-growing use of implied 
waivers, and aggressive applications of Davis and Beheler—all of which 
allowed officers to limit the reach of Miranda and to relocate warnings 
and waivers to the interior of a highly structured interrogation 
process.  I expressed doubts that the Supreme Court could or would 
repair it.  Weisselberg, supra, at 1590-94.  Thompkins has resolved any 
lingering doubts more swiftly and surely than I could have foreseen. 
VI.  THOMPKINS AND POLICE TRAINING 
Thompkins has enormous practical implications for policing.  Many 
law enforcement agencies have already trained police about implied 
waivers.  The “Notification of Constitutional Rights” form used by the 
officers in Thompkins was designed to set up an implied waiver:  the 
form asked Thompkins to acknowledge that he understood his rights 
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but nowhere asked him to waive them.  California’s standard Miranda 
card sets up an implied waiver—though the back of the card contains 
some suggested questions for officers who opt to seek an express waiver. 
Thompkins is likely to change police training in at least three re-
spects.  First, not all law enforcement agencies currently promote im-
plied waivers.  Thompkins will give officers far greater comfort in seek-
ing implied waivers than under prior law, and more agencies will use 
such waivers.  Second, given that a waiver was found under the ex-
treme facts of the Thompkins interrogation, we can expect police to be 
told that a waiver may be implied even after hours of questioning un-
less the defendant can prove that the statement was involuntary under 
traditional standards.  This message is quite different from current 
training.  Third, officers will be told that Davis applies to all types of 
invocations and even at the outset of questioning.  Considering how 
stingy courts have been in finding an unambiguous request under Da-
vis (see, for instance, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2277-78 
(2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)), police will be trained they can 
give warnings and interrogate until a suspect makes a pristine invoca-
tion of her rights. 
VII.  MIRANDA REMAINS—SORT OF 
What does Miranda do today?  A decade ago, in turning aside a di-
rect attack on Miranda, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that Miranda’s 
warnings “have become part of our national culture.”  Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).  True enough.  Miranda re-
mains a potent symbol for the American people.  But symbolism aside, 
as a practical matter Miranda functions largely as a safe-harbor rule for 
police.  Officers know that if they comply with Miranda’s formal stric-
tures, a challenge to the voluntariness of a statement is likely to fail. 
It may be too difficult politically for the Court to overturn Miranda 
even if the majority rejects its central premise.  So, instead, like physi-
cians who prescribe a placebo because they disbelieve a patient’s ear-
lier diagnosis, the justices have given us ineffective procedures to ad-
dress a problem that they do not think exists.  One could wish they had 
addressed the diagnosis directly, which would have opened a much 
larger and welcome debate about the interrogation process and the law. 
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REBUTTAL 
Refocusing on Innocence and Compulsion 
Stephanos Bibas†
Miranda may be a hollow symbol, as Professor Weisselberg 
mourns, but that is nothing to lament.  If Thompkins is unfaithful to 
Miranda, that is only because Miranda was unfaithful to the Fifth 
Amendment’s requirement of compulsion.  Miranda’s protections 
map poorly onto the kinds of compulsion that produce false confes-
sions and the categories of people likely to confess falsely.  Miranda 
thus shielded some savvy, guilty recidivists while doing little to protect 
juveniles, the mentally retarded, and other innocent defendants most 
likely to confess.  Thompkins is just another step toward jettisoning the 
failed Miranda experiment.  The hard question now is how to adopt 
better safeguards tailored to what we now know about false confessions. 
 
I.  INVOCATIONS 
Professor Weisselberg first laments that “a suspect must speak to 
claim the right to silence.”  That claim is specious.  All he need do is 
simply keep his mouth shut.  He also has the option, if the question-
ing grows too heated, of invoking his rights midstream.  As Bill Stuntz 
has argued, Miranda is really a way of giving defendants a tool they can 
invoke if questioning gets to be too overbearing.  William J. Stuntz, 
Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 981-88, 991 (2001).  Empiri-
cal evidence suggests that very few suspects do that; they either invoke 
their right to silence immediately or else speak.  Id. at 988.  But we 
don’t really know what that result means.  The mere presence of waiv-
ers or absence of invocations doesn’t tell us that Miranda is doing 
nothing; maybe police are just staying away from tactics that push 
warned suspects into invoking their rights.  It could be that police 
have long since abandoned the third-degree tactics that were infam-
ous early in the last century, deterred in part by Miranda, so there is 
much less need for a shield against true coercion.  It could also be 
that many defendants don’t understand their rights well enough to 
invoke them midstream.  We don’t know how important each of these 
factors is, though studies do show that adolescent and mentally dis-
abled suspects don’t understand their rights well.  What we do know, 
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however, is that recidivists are far more likely to invoke Miranda rights 
in the first place.  Id. at 993.  Miranda thus gives those most likely to be 
guilty a windfall while doing little to shield the innocent neophyte 
from compulsion. 
The failure of defendants to invoke their rights midstream is 
troubling only if we assume with the Miranda Court that stationhouse 
interrogations inherently or presumptively involve compulsion within 
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  But there is little reason to 
think so.  There is little evidence that police use fists, rubber hoses, or 
similar physical force in interrogation except in the rarest of cases; if 
they did, any confessions would be blatantly involuntary and inadmiss-
ible.  Nor is there much evidence of using concrete threats or promis-
es, as opposed to vague words of soft hope.  There is room to question 
prolonged interrogations involving deprivation of food and sleep, but 
Thompkins expressly noted that it was not addressing such a case.  
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2254 (2010). 
II.  WAIVERS 
Nor am I troubled that Thompkins diluted Miranda’s strong pre-
sumption against waiver.  Waiver is simply a prophylaxis, creating ad-
ditional evidence that a defendant understood her rights and chose 
not to exercise them.  A defendant who does not waive may not un-
derstand English, or may be so intoxicated or mentally ill that any 
confession would be thoroughly unreliable.  But particularly when an 
adult of average intelligence hears and understands her rights, there 
is little reason to presume that any statement is compelled absent an 
affirmative waiver. 
III.  STRETCHING THE IDEA OF COMPULSION 
At the root of Miranda and of Professor Weisselberg’s objections 
to Thompkins is an overbroad understanding of compulsion.  He 
shares Miranda’s assumption that custodial interrogations are inhe-
rently compelling and criticizes Thompkins for focusing narrowly on 
the lack of threats, injuries, fears, or prolonged interrogation. 
Instead, Professor Weisselberg objects that there “is information 
that suspects would want to know before deciding whether to speak” 
and that police are “manipulating the boundary of Miranda’s protec-
tions.”  These claims are unmoored from the Fifth Amendment’s re-
quirement of compulsion, particularly the type of compulsion that 
could lead to false or unreliable confessions.  They sound more like a 
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sporting theory of justice:  Bentham memorably described the desire 
to allow those who are clearly guilty an opportunity to escape blame as 
giving the fox in a fox hunt a fair chance of escaping the hunter.  5 
JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 238-39 (Fred B. 
Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827).  But criminal justice is not a sport; it 
ought to be about seeking the truth.  Convicting the guilty is an im-
perative, as is freeing the innocent.  And absent from both Miranda 
and Professor Weisselberg’s critique is any differentiation of pressures 
that could lead to false confessions from those that generally produce 
true ones. 
Our justice system depends in part on reliable confessions. We 
should not stand in the way of interrogation techniques that produce 
truthful confessions so long as they do not create an unacceptable risk 
of producing false ones.  As Justice Scalia memorably put it, 
it is wrong, and subtly corrosive of our criminal justice system, to regard 
an honest confession as a “mistake.” . . . Not only for society, but for the 
wrongdoer himself, admissio[n] of guilt . . . , if not coerced, [is] inhe-
rently desirable because it advances the goals of both justice and rehabil-
itation. . . . We should . . . rejoice at an honest confession, rather than 
pity the “poor fool” who has made it . . . . 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
If that is right, then Miranda’s lack of impact on psychological in-
terrogation methods, and police exploitation of Miranda’s loopholes, 
should be not mourned but celebrated.  If criminal justice is a search 
for the truth, then Miranda should be no obstacle.  Leaving Miranda as 
a hollow symbol, dead on the inside, may be the best stable compro-
mise that one can make with a flawed decision.  Police have learned to 
live with it, so in practice it costs us few confessions. 
IV.  INVOLUNTARY, FALSE CONFESSIONS 
Professor Weisselberg is on stronger ground complaining that Mi-
randa warnings have become a safe harbor for police.  Miranda meant 
for its warnings and waivers to be necessary conditions of interroga-
tion, not sufficient ones.  Interrogations were still supposed to satisfy 
the traditional due process standards of voluntariness.  But, in prac-
tice though not in theory, lower courts have turned Miranda’s bright-
line rule into a safe harbor—a sufficient condition for admission and 
not just a necessary one. 
Empirical evidence confirms that many involuntariness factors are 
present in false confession cases, yet judges admit the statements.  The 
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bulk of false confessions comes from teenaged, mentally retarded, or 
mentally ill suspects.  A recent empirical study of defendants who con-
fessed falsely but were later exonerated found that thirty-three percent 
were juveniles and forty-three percent were mentally disabled, while 
others were clearly emotionally disturbed.  Brandon L. Garrett, The 
Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1064, 1094-95 
(2010).  Most of the exonerees were questioned for more than a day 
(with breaks only for sleep and food) or multiple times over several 
days, sometimes for as long as thirty to forty hours over a week.  Id. at 
1095.  Yet every one of these forty false confessions was ruled voluntary 
and admissible.  Id. at 1054.  Miranda, in essence, has become a substi-
tute for serious voluntariness scrutiny. 
Miranda’s hollowing out, if not demise, should prompt us to think 
hard about how to prevent these injustices that have persisted along-
side Miranda for decades.  We academics tend to put too much faith 
in judicial review and rules, but case-by-case litigation alone has prov-
en impotent to ferret out and prevent these abuses.  And instead of 
selling interrogation reform as a matter of fair play, reformers should 
focus squarely on measures to protect the innocent and prevent 
wrongful convictions. 
V.  BETTER REFORM IDEAS 
A prime aim of reform ought to be full videotaping of all interro-
gations.  Though many police departments record some interroga-
tions, they sometimes do so selectively, turning on the tape only for 
the final confession or turning off the tape when a suspect gives a 
problematic response.  Automatic, tamper-proof, voice-activated re-
cording equipment with time and date stamps could continuously 
record everything that goes on in an interrogation room.  That is cru-
cial because, in most of the false confessions studied, police appear to 
have disclosed to the suspects (intentionally or inadvertently) non-
public details that were crucial to making their confessions credible.  
Id. at 1068-74.  Full videotaping cannot prevent every abuse—police 
could still taint confessions at the crime scene or in the patrol car, and 
equipment occasionally malfunctions.  But videotaping would greatly 
reduce the opportunities for coercion and suggestion and, when they do 
occur, reveal them to judicial scrutiny.  And though police departments 
initially resist adopting full videotaping, once they begin using it, most 
embrace recording.  They learn to love recording because it protects 
them against false claims of coercion, intimidation, and abuse; obviates 
constant note taking; forecloses motions to suppress; and encourages guilty 
2010] The Right to Remain Silent 81 
pleas.  See THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONG-
FUL CONVICTIONS, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL IN-
TERROGATIONS 6-19 (2004), http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ 
Police_Experiences_Recording_Interrogations.pdf. 
As Professor Garrett suggests, other reforms to interrogation 
techniques are both simple and promising.  Police could strive to keep 
many details of crimes nonpublic and note in the file which facts had 
been held back from the press and public.  They could also use 
double-blind techniques, having interrogators other than the detec-
tives on the case question suspects without knowing the nonpublic 
details, so any confessions would not be tainted by suggestion.  These 
double-blind detectives could even have suspects pick victims out of 
photo arrays, thus excluding those without personal knowledge.  Gar-
rett, supra, at 1115-16. 
Ultimately, the most important step is to do more research and 
craft special safeguards for teenagers, the mentally retarded, and the 
mentally ill or disturbed, who account for most false confessions.  
Though courts are unlikely to forbid long or deceptive interrogations 
in general, they could adopt special rules for these vulnerable classes 
of suspects. 
VI.  HOW TO ACHIEVE REFORMS? 
It is easier to spell out potential reforms than to figure out how to 
implement them in America.  Miranda turned interrogation regula-
tion into countermajoritarian combat, with judges trying to thwart 
reliable interrogation techniques and thus the public’s interest in 
crime control.  Now, however, innocence commissions have changed 
the political dynamic, tapping into the admirable fear of executing an 
innocent man. That is a far more politically appealing and thus more 
durable basis on which to ground interrogation reform. 
So, perhaps I can leave that issue hanging and solicit Professor 
Weisselberg’s response:  What strategies can persuade police depart-
ments, prosecutors’ offices, and legislatures that they need and want 
to pursue interrogation reform?  Can judges, instead of creating intri-
cate and unproven interrogation codes themselves, somehow prompt 
police self-regulation and best practices?  And, in particular, what 
measures would work best to preserve reliable interrogation of defen-
dants who are young, mentally retarded, mentally ill, or emotionally 
disturbed while guarding against suggestion and exploitation?  Those 
are far different questions from the ones posed by Miranda’s blanket 
hostility to interrogation, but ultimately they should prove more fruitful. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
It’s About More Than False Confessions 
Charles D. Weisselberg 
I had hoped Professor Bibas would argue that, post-Thompkins, Mi-
randa’s procedures actually do protect the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination.  I would root for him to win that 
argument because I would like to live in a world in which a relatively 
simple set of procedures affords suspects a meaningful opportunity to 
choose between speech and silence in the stationhouse.  But Professor 
Bibas agrees with me that we do not live in that world, if indeed we 
ever did.  While I call Miranda’s protections “dead” and he prefers the 
term “hollow,” we both see the need to move on and think about oth-
er ways to regulate the process of police interrogation. 
However, moving on requires some agreement about what we 
want to protect as well as an understanding of how modern interroga-
tion actually works.  We cannot simply leave Miranda behind, for that 
decision has a lot to say on both of these points.  Professor Bibas ap-
pears to disagree with the Miranda Court (and me) on two fundamen-
tal aspects of the ruling:  first, that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments protect basic values and aspects of our criminal justice system 
other than the need to avoid false confessions; and second, that mod-
ern interrogation techniques do contain inherently compelling pres-
sures that endanger suspects’ rights and that may undermine some of 
these objectives of our system.  I will address both points and then 
suggest possible reforms. 
I.  THE WHAT—RELIABILITY AND A WHOLE LOT MORE 
Professor Bibas contends that Miranda was unfaithful to the Fifth 
Amendment’s notion of compulsion, arguing that the Court failed to 
differentiate between pressures leading to false confessions and pres-
sures that generally produce true confessions.  We should examine 
both Fourteenth Amendment coercion and Fifth Amendment com-
pulsion (concepts that have generally been merged). 
Voluntariness within the meaning of the Due Process Clause turns 
on “whether the behavior of the State’s law enforcement officials was 
such as to overbear petitioner’s will to resist and bring about confes-
sions not freely self-determined . . . with complete disregard of wheth-
er or not petitioner in fact spoke the truth.”  Rogers v. Richmond, 365 
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U.S. 534, 544 (1961).  A statement by a defendant “might be proved to 
be quite unreliable, but [that] is governed by the evidentiary laws of 
the forum, . . . and not by the Due Process Clause.”  Colorado v. Connel-
ly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).  The purpose of the voluntariness re-
quirement is “to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evi-
dence, whether true or false.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Now to Miranda and the Fifth Amendment:  “[T]he basic purpos-
es that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not relate 
to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving 
the integrity of a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be 
convicted unless the prosecution ‘shoulder the entire load.’”  Tehan v. 
United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).  The Fifth Amend-
ment furthers a “complex of values,” which include respecting the 
dignity and integrity of citizens, maintaining a fair balance between an 
individual and the state, and demanding under our adversary system 
that the government produce evidence by its own labors, “rather than 
by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from [a suspect’s] own 
mouth.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (citation omit-
ted).  While the history of the privilege and many of these values have 
been well debated (see, for example, Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar 
Privilege in Historical Perspective, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 181 (R.H. Helmholz et al. eds., 1997)), the purpose of 
the privilege is not to prevent false confessions.  To be sure, it is some-
times noted that a benefit of Miranda is that it helps avoid the use of 
unreliable statements.  E.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 
(1993).  But the Court’s Miranda decisions emphasize that the goal is 
to protect autonomy:  “[T]he fundamental purpose of . . . Miranda [is] 
‘to assure that the individual’s right to choose between speech and silence 
remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.’”  Connecticut 
v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) (emphasis added) (quoting Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 469).  Perhaps we care about autonomy because, as Profes-
sor Peter Brooks writes, “[t]he law wants and needs a model of human 
agents as free and rational decision-makers, even in the confession of 
guilt.”  PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 76 (2000). 
Contrary to Professor Bibas’s suggestion, an effort to further the 
Fifth Amendment’s legitimate values and objectives ought not be de-
meaned as promoting some “sporting theory of justice.”  Applying the 
Fifth Amendment in the stationhouse requires us to face difficult and 
serious questions.  We must consider the extent to which individuals 
should be allowed to exercise free will in deciding whether to speak, 
the amount of information they should be provided before making 
life-altering decisions, and whether we want suspects to be the same 
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free and rational decisionmakers that we assume them to be when we 
assess criminal culpability.  These are not questions of sport. 
I am also uncertain about the implications of Professor Bibas’s 
theory of coercion and compulsion.  He seems to accept that a state-
ment is involuntary (and a Miranda waiver is involuntary) if one ex-
tracts it by physical force or concrete threats or promises.  These are 
obvious and traditional markers for situations in which a person’s will 
is overborne, yet the concept is broader than these examples.  And if 
Professor Bibas also requires a showing that an officer’s action is likely 
to lead to a false confession, even physical abuse might not suffice.  
We have “strong evidence that coercive techniques increase the odds 
of a false confession . . . but we do not know by how much.  It is possi-
ble, for all we know, that the overwhelming majority of coerced con-
fessions are true.”  Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 188 (2008).  Requiring a causal link between ab-
horrent tactics and reliability would undermine our ability to con-
demn tactics that have no place in a civilized society. 
II.  THE HOW—MODERN POLICE INTERROGATION 
I have argued that Thompkins implicitly rejects the idea that cus-
todial interrogations contain inherently compelling pressures.  Profes-
sor Bibas also rejects this premise, but does so expressly.  I am grateful 
for that, because his candid views further a conversation that is essen-
tial to the process of reform. 
On inherent compulsion, Miranda got it right.  We now know 
much more about the process of interrogation, and the data support 
the Miranda Court’s conclusion.  To begin with, officers do use the 
techniques in police training manuals.  Saul M. Kassin et al., Police In-
terviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Study of Police Practices and Be-
liefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 384 (2007); Weisselberg, supra, at 
1530-37.  Although Professor Bibas would like more research on inter-
rogation tactics and vulnerable populations, let’s begin with the re-
search that we already have. 
It is true that interrogation tactics may affect certain suspects 
more than others.  But we also know that the techniques are them-
selves quite powerful, even on populations of suspects whom we do 
not ordinarily consider vulnerable.  The techniques increase suspects’ 
anxiety, instill a feeling of hopelessness, and distort suspects’ percep-
tions of their choices by leading them to believe they can escape only 
by cooperating with investigators—which is essentially a “fraud.”  RI-
CHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 25 
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(2008).  Interrogation is a carefully constructed, guilt-presumptive 
process.  Researchers have shown that maximization techniques con-
vey implied threats of punishment, and minimization techniques suc-
cessfully convey implied promises of leniency.  Saul M. Kassin & Kar-
lyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions:  Communicating Promises 
and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 234-35 
(1991).  The pressures of interrogation are manifest:  one manual lists 
“Psychological Domination” as the first step of a confrontational inter-
rogation.  Weisselberg, supra, at 1534.  Even if one is most concerned 
with false confessions, as Professor Bibas seems to be, research has 
identified situational risk factors associated with false confessions 
(such as interrogation time, presentation of false evidence, and use of 
common minimization techniques) as well as dispositional risk factors 
(such as age and mental impairment).  Kassin, Police-Induced Confes-
sions, supra at 16-22.  Though there are more studies to discuss, this 
research tells us that the search for coercion or compulsion must in-
volve more than a cursory look for markers such as violence and ex-
press threats and promises, and that the problem of coerced or com-
pelled confessions is not confined to a few vulnerable populations. 
I understand that the Supreme Court does not welcome this news.  
“Where psychology brings ambiguity and complexity and layering of 
motive, the Court wants certainty and bright lines.”  Peter Brooks, The 
Future of Confession, 1 LAW, CULTURE & THE HUMAN. 53, 60 (2005).  
Miranda was a failed effort to provide bright lines and avoid more tax-
ing and nuanced determinations of voluntariness.  If we are honest, 
however, we cannot shut our eyes to the reality that interrogations are 
structured as they are because they lead—and often compel—suspects 
to talk.  Because Miranda is an empty ritual and effectively forecloses a 
meaningful voluntariness inquiry, I have argued that we would be better 
off with a full voluntariness inquiry than with Miranda.  But the inquiry 
must consider the effect of interrogation techniques—even those Pro-
fessor Bibas would call “soft.”  Psychological coercion includes “police 
use of interrogation techniques that, cumulatively, cause a suspect to 
perceive that he has no choice but to comply with the interrogators’ 
demands.”  LEO, supra, at 230.  We cannot simply look for a single 
marker of coercion or compulsion.  The concept of voluntariness is 
more complicated than that.   
III.  REFORM 
In addition to judicial oversight through richer and more 
nuanced voluntariness determinations, I favor legislative and adminis-
trative reforms—though I also struggle with how to create incentives 
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for reform and self-regulation.  One possibility is to offer a trade:  Mi-
randa’s procedures may be replaced with equally effective alternatives, 
see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000), a low bar to clear 
since Miranda’s procedures are themselves singularly ineffective.  Al-
though some officers may prefer to have a “hollow” rule that operates 
as a safe harbor, others in law enforcement may be willing to explore 
reforms if the payoff is dispensing with Miranda’s procedures alto-
gether.  At least this trade-off is worth exploring. 
So what might these reforms be?  I agree with Professor Bibas and 
many other commentators that videotaping interrogations is essential.  
Recording may dampen extreme tactics.  In New South Wales, record-
ing entirely ended the practice of “verballing,” which consisted of of-
ficers fabricating confessions.  DAVID DIXON, INTERROGATING IMAGES 
1, 262 (2007).  While videotaping creates a factual record, it is not a 
panacea.  Some images may prejudice the defendant.  We must also 
ensure that all of the interrogation is recorded, and that cameras show 
both the officer and the suspect.  Id. at 3, 263-75.  Camera angles af-
fect the factfinder’s assessment of a statement.  Daniel Lassiter et al., 
Videotaped Interrogations and Confessions:  A Simple Change in Camera 
Perspective Alters Verdicts in Simulated Trials, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 867, 
867-69 (2002).  Moreover, we still need to assess the legitimacy of what 
is recorded in each case by some acceptable standard. 
I would substantially restrict false evidence ploys and deception 
about evidence.  In addition to documented concerns about false con-
fessions, it is important to build trust between officers and members of 
the community.  The state does not charge all suspects in police inves-
tigations, and deception about evidence undermines trust.  It may also 
have a corrosive effect on law enforcement. 
I would also restrict the use of minimization techniques, which of-
ten contain implied promises of leniency.  Not only are they a risk for 
false confessions, they may lead to a false postadmission narrative, 
even when the defendant is guilty of the offense.  Officers are trained 
to elicit a confession, a suspect’s story, after obtaining an initial admis-
sion.  Yet officers often get that breakthrough admission by suggesting 
minimizing themes without any regard to their truth.  Police are 
trained to develop different themes, and that what is most important 
is that the themes be acceptable to the suspect.  One training video 
advises officers to prepare at least five potential themes before an in-
terrogation.  DVD:  Interrogation Techniques Telecourse (Cal. 
Comm’n on Peace Officers Standards and Training 2005) (on file 
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review); see also FRED E. INBAU 
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ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 239 (4th ed. 2001) 
(“When switching to a different theme, the investigator should not 
indicate disappointment for having presented the first theme.  He 
should just quickly embark upon another.”).  While I am concerned 
with minimization tactics themselves, I am also troubled because of-
ficers develop themes solely to appeal to suspects.  A defendant who 
has accepted an officer’s theme may minimize the wrongfulness of her 
conduct by falsely implicating others. 
Nor are the harms limited to the possibility of wrongfully convict-
ing other people.  I can only begin to imagine the pain experienced 
by a rape victim and her family who watch the videotaped interroga-
tion of a defendant who admits the sexual act but accepts the detec-
tive’s suggestion that the victim “acted like she might have been a 
prostitute;” or that “[i]f she hadn’t gone around dressed like that [the 
defendant] wouldn’t be in this room now;” or that the ten-year-old vic-
tim was “well advanced for her age.”  INBAU, supra, at 256-57. 
Other reforms may be useful, but these are a start.  I am very glad 
for this dialogue, and am grateful to Professor Bibas and the PENNum-
bra editors.  I look forward to Professor Bibas’s closing contribution. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Focusing Remedies on Narrower Problems 
Stephanos Bibas 
Professor Weisselberg vigorously defends Miranda’s expansive 
reading of the Fifth Amendment’s purposes as well as Miranda’s 
strong presumption of compulsion in police interrogation.  The privi-
lege, he argues, is much more about protecting guilty suspects’ au-
tonomy and dignity than about protecting the innocent.  And the 
power of modern interrogation techniques, he claims, shows that they 
compel suspects just as torture, threats, and promises do. 
While his claims are faithful to Miranda and its progeny, they are 
unmoored from the text and history of the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination.  Moreover, they are normatively unattrac-
tive, reaching far beyond unreliable statements and torture to protect 
savvy recidivists from vigorous inquiry into their guilt.  Finally, Miran-
da’s overbreadth has distracted attention from reforms targeted at 
vulnerable suspects and unreliable tactics. 
On a positive note, Professor Weisselberg and I both come to bury 
Miranda, not to praise it.  He is under no illusions that Miranda ever 
worked, let alone that it can be propped up now.  He offers some use-
ful suggestions to reform, suggestions on which I will try to build. 
I.  THE PURPOSES OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST  
COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATION 
First, Professor Weisselberg attempts to bolster Miranda’s reading 
of the Fifth Amendment by quoting a number of its progeny.  To bor-
row from Wittgenstein, that is like trying to verify a newspaper by 
checking it against another copy of itself.  We need to go back to the 
history of the Fifth Amendment and the abuses against which it was 
designed to guard.  Too often people use “the privilege against self-
incrimination” as shorthand, omitting the key word “compelled” from 
its limits.  Thus, Professor Weisselberg embraces a gauzy web of soft 
values such as judicial integrity, individual dignity and autonomy, pri-
vacy, and making the government shoulder the whole burden of prov-
ing guilt in an adversarial system.  He is in good company—the Warren 
Court and many commentators have likewise overread the privilege. 
No serious historian believes that the privilege was adopted for 
such a hash of individualist, modern reasons.  The English, as well as 
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American colonists, feared confessions extracted by torture or the 
compulsion of having to swear an oath, as the Spanish Inquisition and 
the Star Chamber had done.  They probably would have put threats of 
future punishment or promises of leniency into those categories as 
well.  Alschuler, supra, at 192.  But they never would have thought, as 
the Warren Court did, that simply drawing an adverse inference from 
a defendant’s silence is a form of compulsion tantamount to torture 
or threats.  See, e.g. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-25 (1965).  
On the contrary, the privilege allowed judges and magistrates to inter-
rogate suspects forcefully, so long as they were not under oath.  Al-
schuler, supra, at 193. 
In England and colonial America, justices of the peace routinely 
interrogated suspects out of court and drew adverse inferences from 
their silence.  Eben Moglen, The Privilege in British North America:  The 
Colonial Period to the Fifth Amendment, in THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION, supra, at 109, 117-22.  Professor Weisselberg would 
presumably criticize investigators’ drawing of adverse inferences as an 
implied threat.  But the suspects were not forced to be witnesses with-
in the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.  They did not have to testify 
at trial on pain of torture or comparable compulsion, though any pre-
trial confession was admissible at trial.  Id. 
So understood, the privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
was consistent with the colonists’ priorities.  As Akhil Amar has con-
vincingly argued, following Alexis de Tocqueville, the Bill of Rights 
was not some countermajoritarian imposition of unpopular individual 
rights, but was “fundamentally populist and majoritarian.”  AKHIL 
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(2000).  It was not designed to shield guilty suspects from deserved 
punishment, unless authorities used methods tantamount to torture. 
The gauzy tangle of rationales upon which Professor Weisselberg 
relies is unappealing.  As my Rebuttal noted, Miranda’s overbroad 
prophylaxis winds up sheltering few innocent or neophyte defendants, 
but mostly savvy recidivists who are far more likely to invoke their Mi-
randa rights.  Moreover, Professor Weisselberg’s and Miranda’s com-
plex of rationales is directly at odds with other foundational principles 
of Fifth Amendment law.  Lawyers for the government can force par-
ents to testify against their children, can subpoena witnesses to reveal 
embarrassing truths, and can force them to disclose the deepest, most 
incriminating secrets possible so long as they provide immunity.  
Prosecutors can issue subpoenas or use search warrants to confiscate 
incriminating documents and tangible objects.  And they can even 
invade a defendant’s bodily integrity, extracting blood or DNA to 
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prove the defendant’s own guilt.  See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 765 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege does 
not forbid forcibly extracting a defendant’s blood and admitting the 
resulting analysis into evidence).  In other words, the government can 
use defendants in all other kinds of ways to help prove their own guilt 
and invade their privacy and autonomy.  The real distinction is that 
blood samples, fingerprints, subpoenaed documents, evidence from 
searches, and subpoenaed testimony are reliable evidence, while 
coerced confessions are not.  Thompkins, by cutting back Miranda’s 
reach, brings the regulation of interrogations more into line with 
these other areas of Fifth Amendment case law. 
II.  INTERROGATION IS SEDUCTION, NOT COMPULSION 
The ban on torture is not limited to reducing unreliable state-
ments, though that may be one of its key purposes.  But Professor 
Weisselberg cannot plausibly claim that the pressures of stationhouse 
interrogation are remotely analogous to torture.  Suspects may speak, 
and they may regret speaking.  But today, interrogation is far more a 
matter of seduction than compulsion.  The distinction is an important 
one.  Seduction operates through a defendant’s free, autonomous 
choice, to use Professor Weisselberg’s values.  It may establish a false 
rapport; it may play on emotions, sympathies, guilt, and remorse.  But 
those kinds of social influences are such a far cry from the Wicker-
sham Commission’s third degree that one cannot lump them with 
physical violence and concrete threats and promises.  They involve 
lawful pressures, not force or fraud.  I am unpersuaded by Professor 
Weisselberg’s suggestion that most interrogation involves implied 
threats tantamount to force or implied promises rising to the level of 
fraud.  There is little reason to expand the privilege’s truth-defeating 
function—to paternalistically protect guilty suspects from revealing 
their guilt in ways that they may regret but we should celebrate. 
III.  REMAINING CAUSES FOR CONCERN 
That is enough rehashing of stale Miranda-bashing.  Professor 
Weisselberg next cites studies to suggest that a concern for false con-
fessions ought to reach beyond vulnerable suspects (especially juve-
nile, mentally retarded, and mentally ill ones) to certain tactics.  I am 
open to persuasion based on evidence that particular tactics pose an 
unacceptably high risk of eliciting false confessions.  But such a pic-
ture would require fine strokes, not a broad brush.  I seriously doubt 
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that one can generalize that every variety of deception risks inducing 
average adults to confess falsely.  If, for example, police falsely assert 
that they have recovered DNA from the scene of a crime and are 
going to test it, such assertions will make guilty suspects fear convic-
tion but will reinforce innocent suspects’ persistence in waiting to 
clear their names.  If, on the other hand, police falsely tell a rape sus-
pect that a DNA test of the rape kit has positively identified him as the 
rapist, the chance of a false confession would seem to be markedly 
higher.  Those kinds of questions require more empirical study. 
The real basis for Professor Weisselberg’s objection to deception 
seems to be a judicial and police integrity rationale, about which I’m 
ambivalent.  There is certainly some appeal to cultivating a reputation 
for honesty and trustworthiness.  But some kinds of deception are so 
trivial as to make one chuckle instead of censuring the police.  David 
Simon famously recounted how Baltimore police pretended that a 
photocopier loaded with the words “Truth,” “Truth,” and “Lie” was in 
fact a lie detector machine.  David Simon, Homicide: A Year on the Kill-
ing Streets (1991), at 49, 61 in THE MIRANDA DEBATE (Richard A. Leo & 
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998).  Such deceptive pranks hardly 
threaten the innocent and hardly merit the courts’ attention.  Taking 
advantage of criminals’ stupidity and remorse does not violate the 
Constitution. 
Likewise, Professor Weisselberg may be correct that some minimi-
zation techniques are so strong, so corrupting that they warp the con-
fessions that they elicit.  That hypothesis is plausible, but I am not sure 
it is proven.  If it is true, it probably applies only to a subset of minimi-
zation techniques, ones that effectively put a whole story into the sus-
pect’s mouth.  There is a big difference between saying “I’m sure 
you’re not a bad guy and didn’t mean it,” and feeding a suspect a de-
tailed, self-serving story through a sequence of leading questions. 
IV.  ENCOURAGING REFORMS 
I am disappointed that Professor Weisselberg did not begin to ex-
plore possible ways to implement interrogation reforms that do not 
depend upon judges’ willingness to squint at the Constitution and 
engage in armchair empiricism.  As I suggested, and he seems to agree, 
Miranda’s faith in the power of judicial constitutional rulings has prov-
en unfounded.  In closing, I’d like to offer some more thoughts on how 
nonjudicial actors might prompt and develop reforms. 
First, Miranda bred an unhealthy antagonism between courts and 
law enforcement.  Prosecutors and police want to get the guilty and 
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free the innocent (even though, in the heat of the chase, they some-
times develop tunnel vision about who might or might not be guilty).  
If interrogation reforms help them to do that, they will learn to em-
brace them.  That is why my Rebuttal noted that, despite initial resis-
tance, police learn to embrace videotaping once they see how it cap-
tures more incriminating information and protects police against 
baseless charges of abuse. 
Perhaps innocence commissions can prompt police departments 
to engage in randomized, controlled studies of various interrogation 
reforms, of the sort typically used in medical research.  They could, 
for instance, learn to love double-blind interrogations, in which the 
interrogator does not know and so cannot disclose the key details of 
the crime.  It is quite possible that police departments could substitute 
other methods for false-evidence ploys without losing truthful confes-
sions.  Or experiments might show how particular kinds of false-
evidence claims create high rates of false confessions.  Either finding 
might persuade leading interrogation trainers to reform their interro-
gation manuals, producing a culture change over time.  Similar stu-
dies might establish presumptive cut-off times for interrogations and 
requirements for food, sleep, and bathroom breaks.  Existing volunta-
riness doctrine arguably requires such scrutiny already, but Miranda’s 
effective safe harbor has distracted attention from these problems. 
It would also be extremely valuable to study the kinds of interro-
gation techniques that have not induced juvenile, mentally ill, or men-
tally retarded defendants to confess falsely.  Police interrogators ought 
to receive special training and direction on how to spot signs of mental 
illness and retardation and what techniques to use and avoid in such 
cases.  As I suggested previously, we need scalpels, not sledgehammers. 
Rather than obstructing all interrogation as Miranda sought to, reme-
dies must focus on vulnerable populations, protracted interrogations, 
and the disclosure of crime details to taint suspects’ confessions. 
Police can also be disciplined by the prosecutors for whom, in a 
sense, they work.  When I was a federal prosecutor in the U.S. Attor-
ney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, our office had a 
policy of refusing to take any cases that depended on the testimony of 
certain police officers who were known to have been untruthful in the 
past.  That sanction on “testilying” sent a powerful message that police 
had to remain honest if they wanted us to prosecute their cases feder-
ally.  Prosecutors, prodded by embarrassing exonerations such as the 
Central Park Jogger case, could similarly press police for interrogation 
reforms.  If they insisted on videotapes of confessions, or refused to 
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take cases against mentally retarded defendants absent proper safe-
guards, police in their jurisdiction would take note. 
One can even imagine more radical reforms.  Just as the colonists 
had justices of the peace conduct depositions of suspects, so investi-
gating magistrates distinct from the police could conduct double-
blind interrogations today almost like depositions, tempering the 
worst excesses of zeal to convict.  E.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. 
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles:  The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 857, 908 (1995).  Even if that reform is not practical as a 
wholesale substitute for police interrogation, it could at least be tried 
for the most vulnerable populations:  juvenile, mentally retarded, and 
mentally ill defendants. 
At the end of the day, it is wrong to blame Thompkins for disre-
garding Miranda’s hollow edifice.  Police, police trainers, prosecutors, 
innocence commissions, and social scientists are far better placed 
than courts to weed out the worst interrogation methods and propa-
gate the best.  The innocence movement has created the political 
moment for such reforms, from which fruitless debates over Miranda 
should not distract us.  I thank Professor Weisselberg as well as the 
editors for our illuminating disagreement and hope that this dialogue 
will draw our readers into this conversation as well.  
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